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1 Introduction 
Industrial policy has attracted considerable controversy in the development context, 
possibly out of all proportion to its potential impact (either positive or negative). 
Arguably, the intensity of the debate stems from the fact that here the structuralist and 
neoclassical traditions of development studies meet head-on, with the former seeing 
industrial policy as a means of correcting for the limitations of markets and the latter 
seeing it as the highpoint of ‘government failure’. This paper makes a case for a 
pragmatic and limited approach to interventions as a means of stimulating 
industrialization in the context of current and future challenges facing newly 
industrializing economies. It begins with a simple definition of industrial policy, a brief 
survey of the theoretical case and a taxonomy of different possible interventions. The 
second section considers how far government policy per se has contributed to 
manufacturing success, drawing on the very extensive literature in this area. The third 
highlights a series of key issues for today’s industrializing economies that industrial 
policy needs to address, and the final section concludes. 
2  What is the case for industrial policy? 
The term industrial policy is used here in the sense of policy interventions designed to 
affect the allocation of resources in favour of industry (principally manufacturing) as 
distinct other sectors. Such interventions may also affect resource allocation within 
industry in favour of either particular branches or sub-sectors or particular firms (so 
they may be ‘selective’ rather than ‘functional’). Interventions can involve either the 
price mechanism or direct controls and be focussed on export as well as the domestic 
market. Industrial policy in this definition is thus much wider than import substitution 
trade policies with which it is often associated.  
Industrial policy has three dimensions which are sometimes confused in the literature: 
•  The overall vision or strategic direction the government wishes to set. 
•  The process whereby a dialogue is established with the key actors in the private 
and public sectors. 
•  The policy instruments used to affect change. 
Even if there can be broad agreement on the vision—a competitive and dynamic 
industrial sector—there can be different paths to achieving this with varying degrees of 
public ownership, consultation with the private sector, direct controls, fiscal incentives, 
and openness to trade.1  
The theoretical basis for industrial policy as defined here focuses on two propositions, 
the first relatively uncontroversial and the latter rather more so. 
                                                 
1  Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel (2007b) highlight the process aspect of industrial policy and illustrate it 
in relation to South Africa.    2
i)  Markets (particularly in developing countries) fail to produce a social 
optimum due to factors like externalities, lack of information, 
monopolization or social barriers; 
ii)  Manufacturing industry has a special role in growth due to its greater scope 
for generating high levels of and growth in productivity (at least at relatively 
early stages of development) and externalities.2  
The early development literature was full of analyses of how market failures could be 
overcome by government intervention; through coordinating investments to overcome 
demand constraints (the big push/balanced growth) analyses of Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Nurkse, through encouraging the absorption of the labour surplus in manufacturing (the 
Lewis model), and through building learning-by-doing (through infant industry 
protection). Significantly the original neoclassical tradition of the development literature 
equally embraced market failure and acknowledged the need for intervention to address 
this. The difference was that in this analysis optimal interventions should be designed to 
minimise by-product costs and thus should be based on the price mechanism through 
tax subsidy measures.3 Unlike later policy interpretations, in this analysis subsidies to 
compensate for market failures were wholly acceptable. The rationale for interventions 
based on market failure logically implies that support should be offered equally to all 
participants in the market (‘functional’ support). The functional versus selective 
distinction is never precise since only certain firms will benefit from even broad 
changes in policy; for example, only producers of internationally tradable goods gain 
from an exchange rate devaluation and only firms large enough to conduct R&D gain 
from tax credits related to this type of expenditure. 
The clearest statement of the original case for manufacturing as a special ‘engine of 
growth’ though its capacity for productivity growth and externalities comes from the 
work of Nicholas Kaldor who highlighted the capacity of manufacturing to generate 
‘dynamic increasing returns’, that is rising productivity through the expansion of 
production. This is in contrast to agriculture, where productivity growth was seen as 
arising through labour-saving technical change and the movement of workers off the 
land, and to services, which respond passively to increases in other sectors (although it 
is now understood that this analysis underestimated the potential for new branches of 
services linked with the computer-based technology to generate sustained productivity 
growth and behave in the same way as manufacturing).4 More recent theorizing 
following Krugman has extended this analysis of dynamic sectors by building 
                                                 
2  Rodrik (2007) associates industrial policy with any form of selective intervention not just that 
favouring manufacturing. Arguably this broadens the concept too far to be very useful. He also adopts 
the broad definition of industrial policy used here to cover both functional and selective and market-
based as well as direct measures. 
3  Corden (1974) is the classic statement of this ‘policy hierarchy’ approach. For example, instead of 
compensating new manufacturing activity for paying a wage above the opportunity cost of rural 
labour by granting tariff protection (and thus penalizing consumers) compensation should be through 
an employment subsidy (whose cost could be spread over all tax payers not just consumers of the 
product in question).  
4  Weiss (2002: ch. 4) sets out the Kaldor case. The introduction of the selective employment tax (to tax 
service sector employment) in the UK in the late-1960s designed by Kaldor was a dramatic (and 
highly controversial) example of industrial policy in a developed economy context.    3
increasing returns into trade theory models and thus highlighting the importance of ‘first 
mover advantages’. Once established (perhaps behind tariff barriers) an activity can 
build on its productivity growth to become internationally competitive. Similarly more 
recent new economic geography models have stressed the importance of location 
externalities (‘agglomeration effects’) arising through labour market effects, networks 
of suppliers, or various knowledge spillovers. Not all of these agglomeration effects 
need arise from manufacturing but many will, and arguably the sector has greater 
capacity to produce these externalities than does services.5  
The ‘self-discovery’ model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) sets out the case for 
subsidising risk-taking activity in the introduction of new products and technologies as 
all potential followers gain from the actions of innovators. Manufacturing need not be 
the only activity where this type of externality occurs, but provided innovation is more 
prevalent there the model again provides a justification for its special place in growth. If 
increasing returns and externalities are the rationale for intervention logically this 
implies selectivity in support, since the scope for these effects will vary both between 
branches and between firms in branches. 
In brief there is no shortage of theoretical arguments that can be utilized to make a case 
for industrial policy. The objections relate to its feasibility and the possibility of policy 
‘capture’. 
3  Different perspectives on industrial policy 
In the literature two competing perspectives have emerged on the role and application of 
industrial policy. One can be characterized as a ‘promotional’ approach. Here 
governments are recommended to think big and to support and promote either sub-
sectors or firms within these. The aim is to shift fairly rapidly into new, dynamic, and 
technologically sophisticated activities. Some of these may be quite different from the 
goods in which the economy is currently specialized. Since by definition some will be 
new activities for the economy firms may need financial incentives to justify the risk 
involved. Governments are perceived as promoters who act as catalysts and who 
provide the financial support needed during the learning period of the new firms and 
assist in the process of industrial start-up with training, export marketing, and the 
general coordination of support activities.  
The other perspective, which can be characterized as a ‘market-based’ approach, sees 
governments as facilitators whose role is to address the malfunctioning of markets either 
to correct for externalities or provide the information and infrastructure needed by 
firms. Although this role may seem modest it can be substantial where governments 
interpret market failure in a broad sense, for example providing credit where the 
financial sector is risk averse, or training where firms under-invest due to the risk of 
workers leaving. From this latter perspective the facilitating government corrects for 
failures, whilst leaving firms to decide how far they wish to innovate and upgrade their 
                                                 
5 UNIDO (2009) presents data on the empirical significance of agglomeration effects from 
manufacturing. Collier and Venables (2007) have a useful discussion of their significance in modern 
manufacturing.   4
production; support is available to all firms affected by the market failure not to a 
selected few.  
These distinctions can be linked with the concept of ‘economic distance’ defined in 
terms of the similarity between the skills and technological capabilities required to 
produce different sets of goods. Thus distance is low where similar capabilities are 
required to produce two goods and high where markedly different capabilities are 
involved. The promotional approach can be thought of as an attempt to move into the 
production of dissimilar or distant goods and the market-based one to a closer or similar 
set of goods to those in which the economy is already specialized. Quantification of 
economic distance is complex although there have been recent efforts based on the 
probability that pairs of countries have a comparative advantage in the same two 
goods.6 The difference in approach to economic distance underlies the debate on 
industrial policy between Lind and Chang (2009). When Lin writes of a facilitating state 
that supports activities with a comparative advantage and Chang of a more 
interventionist state that funds technological upgrading, they are, in effect, discussing 
different strategies towards distance, with Lin advocating a move to closer and Chang to 
more distant product lines to those in which an economy is currently specialized. 
Practical advice can of course draw on both approaches. The most recent academic 
interpretation of industrial policy, as developed by the Hausmann-Rodrik team at 
Harvard University has been applied to a number of countries and draws on both 
perspectives. For example, in their analysis of the policy options for South Africa 
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel (2008a) argue that industrial policy should work at two 
levels. At the first micro level (what they term ‘in the small’) this involves a regular 
dialogue between the government and the private sector where bottlenecks and market 
failures are identified and the government plays a coordinating and facilitating role to 
remove these. The second level (what they term ‘in the large’) involves a more 
ambitious role for government in providing funds in the form of risk capital for 
innovative ventures though a public venture capital fund or a development bank. The 
aim is to support risk-taking activities that are genuinely new to a country and represent 
a major shift away from current specialization. The rationale for public support is that 
risk takers who innovate provide a path for others to follow and thus create a form of 
external benefit for which they are not compensated, so in the absence of public support 
there will be too little risk-taking and innovation. Since, as noted above, a lack of funds 
for new activities can be interpreted as a credit market failure, this is compatible with 
the market-based perspective. However, aspects of their recommendations suggest 
elements of a promotional approach where the government selects a priority area and 
then looks for and supports private investors to develop it. Since the support that can be 
offered will be limited, in practice either explicitly or implicitly governments will be 
favouring some areas over others.7  
                                                 
6  Distance is calculated for pairs of individual products (i and j) based on the probability that countries 
in the world have a specialization (revealed comparative advantage ratio above unity) in both. Goods 
thus are similar where there is a high probability that if a country is specialized in i it will also be 
specialized in j; see Hausmann and Klinger (2006).  
7  Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) describe this dilemma dramatically as being ‘doomed to choose’. 
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What sort of intervention is likely to be involved with industrial policy under the broad 
definition used here? Table 1 sets out a simple taxonomy distinguishing between 
‘market-based’ and ‘promotional’, where as noted above roughly the former aim to 
correct for market failures as they affect existing activity and the latter to promote or 
create new activities with the potential for productivity growth and externalities (or to 
restructure activities with potential). ‘Functional’ means widely available as opposed to 
‘selective’, which refers to favoured activities or firms (although as noted above the 
distinction is never precise). Although the correspondence is not exact, the old-style 
selective measures associated with past industrial policy in many low- and middle-
income countries roughly equate to promotional measures and the market-based 
measures correspond to what is seen as legitimate market corrections in conventional 
policy-thinking.  
Each measure has its advantages and disadvantages. Government expenditure on 
infrastructure provision, for example, may lower production and transport costs and 
boost the incentive to invest in industry. However, it has to be financed and thus places 
strong demands on fiscal policy. Tax concessions of various types do not involve direct 
expenditure, but only benefit firms after investment decisions have been made. The 
availability of credit will be important to investors where the commercial banking 
system is not playing its financial intermediation role effectively, but where domestic 
savings are insufficient external funds will have to be found. How far credit should be 
available at a concessional or subsidized interest rate is highly controversial. Low-
interest loans raise the incentive to invest, but run the risk of encouraging low-return 
activities, since investors do not need to cover the opportunity cost of the funds. In 
addition, they may, if used widely, shift the choice of technology in a capital-intensive, 
labour-saving direction. Import protection has the great attraction of not requiring 
additional revenue, since support for investors is provided by domestic consumers of the 
protected goods. However, whilst the theoretical case for protecting infant industries is 
well-established, protection can also create the wrong incentives through an anti-export 
bias and the sheltering of high-cost producers. 
As set out, the degree of controversy over these measures is meant to increase moving 
down the table. Thus most governments subsidise private R&D, provide some state 
investment in research with industrial potential and fund labour training. The market-
based measures have been described in many countries as ‘competitiveness policy’ and 
most countries apply some or all of these. On the other hand developing country 
governments are typically warned against selective promotional measures, particularly 
because of the risk of rent-seeking, and WTO rules, and those of regional trading 
agreements limit the scope for promotional measures.8  
4  Industrial policy and growth 
Empirical evidence suggests that the arguments from the early development literature 
on the role of manufacturing have broadly stood the test of time. Particularly at 
                                                 
8  Chang (2009) makes the point that the freedom of discretion is greater than might be thought since 
although some selective subsidy measures are in principle ‘actionable’ at WTO, this does not mean 
complaints will be made (particularly where a country plays a small role in world or regional trade) 
and restrictions do not apply to domestic as opposed to trade-related subsidies.    6
relatively low-income levels a dynamic manufacturing sector will be important in 
raising income, creating jobs, and diversifying exports. It is well-established that as 
countries grow up to a threshold income level the share of manufacturing in GDP rises 
and recent work has linked a rising share of manufacturing with growth accelerations 
and with a diversification of exports, which in turn has a positive effect on growth.9 
However, the evidence that manufacturing remains an important sector, particularly for 
relatively low-income economies that are well below the threshold at which the 
manufacturing share in GDP stabilises, does not demonstrate that earlier industrial 
policy interventions per se have had a positive effect. Because of the diversity of 
experience it is difficult to establish major generalizations from what is a vast literature. 
However, there are some things we do know. 
It is well-established that today’s industrialized economies offered various support to 
their industries at their take-off stage (Chang 2002). Post-1945 success with versions of 
industrial policy in developed economies has been claimed in, amongst others, France 
(through indicative planning), Finland (through technology policy), and Ireland 
(through targeting of high-technology foreign investment). In terms of foreign trade, it 
is clear that free trade has been a policy of the economically strong, adopted when their 
economies were competitive enough to benefit from opening to foreign competition. 
This generalization applies, for example to the UK and USA in the nineteenth century 
and to Japan in the 1960s, Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and more recently China in 
the 1990s. None of these economies were ‘early trade liberalizers’, although all have 
benefited greatly from liberalization when it came.  
East Asia is the region of the developing world where there is the most plausible case 
for the successful application of industrial policy. Japanese experience with state 
financial support for selected industries though subsidized directed credit programmes, 
and the use of ‘administrative guidance’ and control over licenses for technology 
imports to influence industrial structure, greatly influenced policy in Korea and to a 
lesser degree Taiwan (Weiss 1986). Although all economies in the region applied some 
or all of the measures listed in Table 1 there was never a unique East Asian model 
(when one is mentioned it is usually a simplified version of policy in Korea circa 1970) 
with the emphasis on different measures varying between countries and changing over 
time within the same country. Broadly speaking this change reflected a shift between 
the early promotional measures to the market-based ones. At the early stages of 
industrialization key sub-sectors were highlighted and promoted strongly with directed 
credit, import protection, and favours in licensing. As manufacturing became more 
sophisticated and the technologies used more complex this selective approach was 
gradually replaced by a functional one more supportive of the decisions of firms 
themselves. The distinction is roughly between initially creating winners and later 
letting them emerge. The mix of policy measures was sometimes complex. China, for 
example, has employed a twin track approach of liberalizing the economy to foreign 
trade, through special economic zones and later WTO entry and encouraging foreign 
investment and the transfer of foreign technology. At the same time it has employed 
                                                 
9  ADB (2007) examines these issues for developing Asia, finding support for the special role of 
manufacturing in growth; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007a) make the case that what you export 
matters and that high-value (chiefly manufactured exports) generates more rapid GDP growth, 
controlling for other factors. However, there is also emerging evidence that in some countries (most 
notably India) parts of the service sector are also playing this role.   7
measures to support large national conglomerate firms and to encourage local R&D 
(Nolan 2001).10  
However, the record with industrial policy, even within East Asia, is both mixed and 
controversial. It is seen as much more effective in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore than 
elsewhere. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, for example, it is viewed 
principally as driven by cronyism and patronage rather than rational economic 
calculation and associated with high-cost protectionist trade policy.11 Where it worked 
well key characteristics of policy appear to be flexibility, so measures changed over 
time in line with economic conditions, use of performance requirements, where special 
support was time-limited and conditional on achieving specified targets, and a focus on 
exporting. Also where it worked well governments were strong enough to avoid capture 
by producer interests and could take decisions on a national not sectional basis. This 
independence of the planning bureaucracy seems to have been more important than their 
technical calibre (at least in Korea and Taiwan, but possibly not in Singapore).12  
However, even in the acknowledged success stories empirical studies have had 
difficulty in demonstrating that industrial policy made a difference. This is partly 
because much of the theoretical case rests on externalities of various types which are 
difficult to pin down empirically, particularly when they are of the technological type 
and operate at the sector or economy-wide levels. In addition, any counterfactual test of 
what would have happened without policy intervention is little more than speculative.13 
Given this empirical ambiguity advocates of industrial policy largely base their case on 
the association between government support of various types, which raised the 
profitability of manufacturing, and subsequent export success from the promoted 
activities. As Stiglitz (2001: 19) puts it  
The fact that almost all economies of the region had industrial policies 
(with the exception of Hong Kong, China which benefited from the 
industrial policies of its neighbour, Mainland China) suggests that such 
polices were an important part of their growth strategies, whether or not 
the highly imperfect econometric techniques for quantifying such 
impacts succeeded in verifying such claims (emphasis in the original).  
Elsewhere in the developing world evidence on the success of industrial policy is far 
more difficult to find. In India, for example, the import substitution programme of the 
                                                 
10 In an otherwise excellent book on Chinese economic development Bramall (2009) argues that by 
entering WTO China has abandoned the tools of industrial policy that created the successful 
industrialization of Korea and Taiwan. This fails to recognise that trade liberalization on its own terms 
and at its own pace has been an integral part of industrial strategy in China. WTO entry ensured 
China’s most favoured nation status which was critical for its manufactured exports. Exchange rate 
protection, through deliberate undervaluation, has been retained as a key policy measure. 
11 Weiss (2005) surveys the evidence in more detail. 
12 Chang (2009) stresses this and points as evidence to the fact that in the early 1960s Korea sent civil 
servants to attend training programmes in the Philippines and Pakistan two countries not known for 
the success of their measures to support industry.  
13 Detailed work reported in Pack (2001) and Noland and Pack (2003) based on input-output relations 
and assumptions about productivity growth and knowledge transfers suggests positive, but modest 
impacts on GDP growth from industrial policy in Korea and Taiwan, respectively.    8
1960s and 1970s has been associated with high cost, uncompetitive production, and the 
system of licensing controls (the Licence Raj) that began to be dismantled gradually in 
the 1980s is seen a major obstacle to private sector initiative. The most that can be 
claimed for industrial policy over a period of thirty years is that through its learning 
effects it may have laid the ground for the growth acceleration after the liberalization of 
the early 1990s (Rodrik and Subramaniam 2005). In Sub-Saharan Africa most industrial 
policy in the early post-colonial period was a version of import substitution, largely 
leading to high-cost, low-quality production for small domestic markets. The shift 
towards manufactured exports in the 1990s after the reforms of the structural adjustment 
era has been modest and African economies suffer from serious deficiencies in 
infrastructure, service provision, and access to credit which make it difficult for them to 
overcome entry barriers into export markets (UNCTAD 2008).  
The region where the contrast with East Asia is made most frequently is Latin America. 
In 1960 the latter was by far the more industrialized region, with a tradition of 
government intervention and a technically skilled bureaucracy. However, in terms of 
manufacturing it has been long left behind by East Asia and it is difficult to find case 
studies of the successful impact of industrial policy in the region (Weiss and Jalilian 
2004).14 Arguably none of the explanations of the much poorer performance of 
industrial policy in Latin America as compared with East Asia are wholly convincing on 
their own; they include lack of performance requirements (‘too much carrot and too few 
sticks’), greater corruption and bureaucratic capture, a premature shift to ‘secondary 
import substitution’, and a lack of incentive to focus on manufactured exports due to 
either larger domestic markets or greater availability of natural resources than in East 
Asia.  
In short, the recent track record of industrial policy in the developing (as opposed to the 
developed) world suggests that it was too often associated with import substitution 
policies that failed to deliver internationally competitive production and that whilst in 
principle it can work effectively (and has done so in a few countries) it is difficult to 
implement. Further the shifting use of industrial policy in the successful cases (from 
what is termed here promotional to market-based measures) indicates the need for 
flexibility and for tailoring interventions to the state of the economy and the broader 
international environment. International experience, drawing particularly from East 
Asia, suggests that the precise mix of instruments used in the application of industrial 
policy is less important than the pursuit of several broad principles to ensure that these 
lead to genuine industrial development as opposed to increasing the profits of the 
recipients (Weiss 2005). These conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
•  A regular dialogue with the private sector, through industry associations or 
chambers of commerce to identify problems is important provided governments 
can avoid capture by producer interests. 
•  Clear performance criteria should be established so the success or otherwise of 
an intervention can be judged and there should be transparency regarding who 
receives government support. 
                                                 
14 The fact that the examples cited for the success of industrial policy in the region are typically Embraer 
aircraft in Brazil and the salmon industry in Chile, supported by Fundacion, Chile, shows the limited 
range of options. One might add the automobile sector in Mexico, supported by a special programme 
to raise local content and generate exports (Ros 1994).    9
•  Support should be time-limited not open-ended, so recipients have an incentive 
to improve efficiency by the end of the period specified. 
•  As far as possible support should be for broad activities (such as R&D or labour 
training) or sectors (like electronics) rather than to individual firms to avoid 
distorting competition and establishing monopolies.15 
•  Exporting should be encouraged as a means of introducing competition and 
opening a sector to foreign technology. 
5  Challenges for the future 
There are many possible future challenges ahead that a version of industrial policy can 
help to address and five are identified here. 
5.1 Financial  sector  reform 
In many countries a key aspect of industrial policy will be to create or sustain an 
adequate system of financial intermediation that ensures that the long-term funds 
needed for industrial investment are forthcoming. In many countries it is still difficult to 
access long-term credits, and where these are available a high-risk premium is built into 
lending rates of interest. Poor corporate governance and lack of transparency in business 
operations are said to have made it difficult for banks to assess credit risk and forced 
them to rely on collateral-based lending with high-risk premiums, particularly for small 
and medium enterprises. Alternative models of financial intermediation include lending 
through a commercial banking sector with a sufficiently long-term horizon, the use of 
equity through venture capital schemes, and a state-owned industrial development bank. 
In many lower and middle-income countries the commercial banking sector is not 
sufficiently developed to play this intermediation role adequately, which opens up a key 
role for public intervention.  
Where there is a reasonably well-developed stock exchange state-funded venture capital 
schemes provide a mechanism to support innovation with a ready exit strategy through 
the sale of the government equity stake once a company is on a sound footing. 
Alternatively public funds can be channelled through a state industrial development 
bank. State-owned development banks have gone out of fashion in recent years with 
many advising that a preferable option is the development of a commercial banking 
sector that can provide long-run finance on a more efficient basis. The case against 
development banks is that by attempting to combine commercial, economic, and social 
objectives they can fund unviable projects which squander national resources. To avoid 
such risks clear criteria need to be established before projects are accepted. These must 
focus on the demonstrated potential net benefits to the economy from the projects 
concerned, as well as their financial viability. Techniques for assessing both economic 
and financial returns of projects are readily available and have been applied by 
                                                 
15 There is some dispute as to whether sector targeting is sensible, with some preferring to stress support 
to activities that generate externalities and may span several sectors; see Hausmann and Rodrik (2005: 
79). 
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international development agencies for many years.16 To avoid the risk of multiple 
objectives confusing decision-taking it is preferable not to incorporate employment 
generation or distributional change as separate criteria for project acceptance, leaving 
policy instruments other than development bank funding (such as labour training or 
social sector expenditure) to address these important considerations directly.  
5.2  Breaking into global production networks 
As is well-known, globalization has meant that in many branches of manufacturing—
with low weight to value ratios and technical divisibility of production—there has been 
a growing trend to fragmentation of production. This has allowed low-wage economies 
to be integrated into global production networks either as supply contractors or ‘own 
equipment manufacturers’. The parts of the developing world which have been least 
successful in integrating their producers into these networks—chiefly Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America—are where manufacturing export growth has been slowest. 
In future decades the evolution of these networks is likely to be driven by two factors: 
the continued decline in ‘trade costs’ (the cost of doing business globally, including 
transport and communication costs) and the increasing global concentration of 
production amongst lead firms and their first-tier suppliers (Nolan, Zhang, and Liu 
2008). These factors will be expected to work in contrary directions with the former 
making it easier and the latter more difficult for inexperienced developing country firms 
to break into these networks. However, the expectation must be that niches still exist for 
newcomer firms and that state support will be helpful in accessing these. Potential 
industrial policy measures range from export-marketing facilities, trade credit (and 
possibly time-limited export subsidies which are allowable for least developed 
countries) for small local firms to investment incentive packages, and supportive 
infrastructure investment for foreign investors. In dealing with foreign investors there 
are now clear restrictions imposed by WTO rules and it is no longer possible to link 
incentives with export or local content targets, as was done in the past, although non-
trade-related targets like employment or output growth) can be used. Other wider 
aspects of the ‘investment climate’ relating to governance and institutional issues will 
also need to be addressed.17  
5.3  Facing competition from the reemerging giants 
Most forecasts suggest that China, and to a lesser degree India, will have a major impact 
on the pattern of global growth.18 For developing countries with a competitive 
manufacturing sector this poses a great opportunity to export to these large rapidly 
expanding markets. Neighbouring economies in East Asia have already seen a 
significant rise in their exports of equipment, parts and components (often as part of 
trade within regional production networks) with these economies running trade 
surpluses with China. In addition with the increasingly affluent consumer markets in the 
two giant economies there is an opportunity for the export of competitively priced 
                                                 
16 Textbooks such as Curry and Weiss (2000) or Potts (2002) make clear the distinction between 
economic and financial effects. 
17 Boardman (2007) gives a detailed assessment of investment climate issues holding back African 
manufacturing. 
18 See the detailed analyses in the chapters in Winters and Yusuf (2007).   11
consumer goods, of a product quality and style unsuited to the markets of higher income 
economies.  
On the other hand middle-income developing economies with well-established 
manufacturing sectors face a major competitive threat from China, in particular, both in 
their traditional export markets of North America and Europe and potentially in their 
home markets as well. China has been competing at both the low-technology unskilled 
labour-intensive and high-technology skill-intensive ends of the product spectrum, and 
its gains in export market share at the expense initially of other East Asian economies 
and more recently of Latin and Central American economies have been well 
documented.19 Greater competition in domestic markets may come if there are further 
reductions tariffs for manufactures, as part of the WTO negotiating process. Average 
applied tariffs for non-agricultural goods are now relatively low (10 per cent to 15 per 
cent) in most middle- income economies, but there are peaks for sensitive items so 
average bound tariffs in India, Brazil and Mexico, for example, are 30 per cent to 35 per 
cent.20 Reductions in these will create competitive pressure on domestic firms. 
To meet this competitive pressure middle-income developing economies need to 
upgrade their technological capability. This is likely to require state support, for 
example in the form of training initiatives, publicly funded research centres, incentives 
for private sector R&D, and venture capital funding to support risk-taking. The case for 
boosting the higher technology segment of manufactured exports is strengthened if the 
long-term trend—whereby these types of manufactures have been the fastest growing 
element of world trade—is continued.21  
Similarly at lower levels of technological sophistication low-wage economies in Africa 
may also see their domestic markets threatened by cheaper goods from China. In many 
products higher productivity allows Chinese goods to be produced at lower unit costs 
than in most African economies despite significantly higher wages in China. There is a 
fear in many countries that the route to industrialization through the production and 
subsequent export of labour-intensive manufactures like textiles, clothing, footwear, and 
toys may be blocked by Chinese competition. How far this threat will be ameliorated in 
the medium-term by appreciation of the Chinese currency is unclear and there is a 
significant agenda for African governments wishing to address lack of local 
competitiveness through a supportive industrial policy. 
5.4 Addressing  climate  change 
One certainty is that future industrialization will be strongly influenced by 
governments’ reaction to climate change. The key issue here is the energy, and therefore 
carbon emission, content of different manufacturing outputs and the future cost that is 
imposed on producers of such emissions. Estimates of the damage caused per ton of 
                                                 
19 See for example Lall and Albaladejo (2004), and Jenkins, Dussel Peters, and Mesquita Morreira 
(2008). 
20 Data are from the WTO website. 
21 UNIDO (2009) reports that in the short period 2000–05 it is resource-based manufactures that have 
grown most rapidly, although over longer period 1990–2005 the higher technology goods have had 
the most rapid growth.    12
carbon emission provide a value for the ‘social cost of carbon’ which in theory should 
form the basis of an optimal carbon tax to be levied by national governments.22 
Whether future carbon charges are through taxation or through the price emerging from 
a market in permits to use carbon the expectation must be that in the longer term there 
will be a major impact on both sources of energy and the location of energy-using 
industries. If similar carbon charges are not adopted in all countries there will be a 
further migration of energy-intensive heavy industries, like steel, chemicals, non-ferrous 
metals, petrochemicals, cement, and pulp and paper, to the developing world, assuming 
similar carbon charges are not adopted there. To some extent this migration is already 
taking place, driven by differences in wage and raw material costs, but an additional 
cost of carbon would accelerate the process. 
If there is a global ceiling on emissions, then global welfare will be unaffected by this 
migration, but the recipient country would benefit from the national value added created 
by the migrating industry. However, if the notion of a global ceiling is unrealistic then 
there will be a trade-off between the national gain and the negative global externality 
created by the contribution to global warming. Insofar as individual countries sign up to 
post-Kyoto emissions targets, it will be necessary for government policy to support the 
adoption of best-practice energy-efficient technologies. From a global perspective if 
breakthrough technology (such as carbon capture and storage) becomes commercially 
viable there is a strong case that it should be transferred to poorer countries as part of 
overseas development assistance at its marginal (not full) cost. 
5.5  Avoiding jobless growth 
Manufacturing industry can play a key role in growth, as discussed above, through 
creating high-productivity jobs. Historically in the developed economies, and more 
recently in the successful newly industrialized economies, this wage income has helped 
greatly in pulling large sections of the population out of poverty. Experience of poverty 
reduction in China in the 1990s with millions of workers migrating from the central and 
western parts of the country to take up manufacturing jobs in the coastal areas and 
special zones is dramatic evidence of this.  
It is well-known that as the manufacturing sector grows in technological sophistication 
and in the level of labour productivity the employment elasticity with respect to output 
declines, sometimes steeply.23 What has become a concern more recently has been the 
slow rate of job creation in manufacturing in economies with relatively low income 
levels. In most of Latin America, for example, manufacturing share in income and 
employment is now very similar to that in Europe and North America whilst the 
income per capita level is much lower creating what has been termed ‘premature 
deindustrialization’, with the risk that new entrants to the labour market end up in low-
productivity activities in services or informal parts of manufacturing. 
                                                 
22 Tol (2009) gives a comprehensive survey of estimates of the social cost of carbon. He points out that 
substantial reduction in carbon emissions requires a carbon tax of at least US$50/ton of carbon. 
23 For example for the period 1980–2004 Felipe et al. (2007: table 2) calculate employment elasticities in 
manufacturing of 0.81 and 0.55 for the Philippines and Thailand, respectively and of 0.14 for both 
Korea and Taiwan.   13
In part such trends may reflect the direction of global technical change that may 
continue in the future, but low employment growth may also be due to factors that 
industrial policy needs to address. In some countries, particularly India, it has been 
argued that inflexible labour markets with significant employment protection rights 
dissuade employers from taking on new workers. There is some evidence supporting 
this from analysis across states in India with different labour laws, but it remains 
controversial, particularly since a skilled and permanent workforce (as opposed to one 
that is a low-cost and transitory) should offer a superior longer term route to 
international competitiveness.24  
Slow overall employment growth in manufacturing may also be due to the coexistence 
of expanding and declining branches of the sector. This has emerged as a major issue in 
China, for example, with a dramatic fall in the number of workers employed in the state 
owned enterprise sector in the last ten years and only a modest increase in overall 
manufacturing employment.25 The role of industrial policy here will be to accelerate the 
assimilation of retrenched workers through retraining and to support temporarily the 
restructuring of failing activities, which are judged to have a long-term future. As the 
impact of globalization and freer trade spreads across the developing world we can 
expect acceleration in the reallocation of resources within and between sectors and the 
case for state guidance of this process will be strengthened.  
6 Conclusions 
The case argued here is that industrialization remains an important objective for most 
developing countries and that there are numerous theoretical reasons why well-designed 
industrial policy interventions, whilst no panacea, can help. Paradoxically, one can 
argue that where such interventions are most needed (in the lowest income countries 
with thin markets and a small private sector) the capacity to introduce them is weakest. 
There are plenty of practical problems that can be identified and what will be feasible 
will be context-specific. Broadly speaking the challenges for governments to address in 
middle-income economies relate to competitiveness and the development of 
technological capability. For poorer countries, well within the international technology 
frontier, support will have to focus on export upgrading using imported technology, 
location within global production networks, and the removal of key bottlenecks to 
successful investment.  
How governments can help with specific policy interventions will need to be identified 
as part of a regular dialogue with the private sector through industry or trade 
associations, so critical aspects of the business environment can be highlighted. 
                                                 
24 This has been debated intensely in the Indian context. Overall since the early 1970s formal sector 
employment in manufacturing in India has been growing at little more than 1 per cent annually (with 
no acceleration in the post-1991 period), although growth in informal sector employment appears to 
have been considerably higher (Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar 2008). 
25  Official figures suggest only a very modest rise of 3.4 million extra workers employed in 
manufacturing between 1991 and 2003 (when the data series stops; see www.adb.org). Corrections to 
this data to account for the omission of workers from what was the township and village enterprises 
sector and migrant workers suggest total manufacturing employment in 109 million in 2002 (as 
compared with the official figures of 83 million), but still suggest the same trend of a slow overall 
growth with employment peaking at 130 million in 1996 and declining subsequently with the changes 
in ownership and restructuring (Bramall 2009: 426).   14
Constraints identified in this way, whether lack of long-term credit, shortage of power, 
lack of labour skills, or ‘dumping’ by foreign competitors or temporary import surges, 
can set the agenda for policy interventions.  
This paper has argued that industrial policy should be viewed as widely as possible, 
encompassing the range of measures in Table 1 (and other possible ones not included 
there). In terms of past debates the inward- versus outward-looking debate is now 
largely resolved. There is scope for ‘natural’ import substitution, created by large 
domestic markets and trade costs, but new policy-induced programmes make little sense 
aside from the larger countries and even there on only a temporary and selective basis. 
Current bound tariff rates in many countries allow this sort of temporary protection, and 
whilst it may provide a short-term boost to profitability, it has to be combined with 
initiatives to support productivity growth and exports.  
In terms of the promotional versus market-based distinction used in Table 1 at lower 
income levels when markets are thin and options are limited, promoting a number of 
key activities may make sense. This is likely to require dealing with major foreign 
investors with a negotiated package of special incentives. As economies grow and the 
manufacturing sector becomes more complex the case for such selectivity weakens 
because of the difficulty of setting priorities. If too many activities are treated as 
priorities the system becomes ineffectual.26 This is where the availability of functional 
support available to all who wish to take it up becomes relevant. Support for risk-taking 
though public sector venture capital funds is an important aspect of this strategy that has 
a sound basis in economic theory.  
In summary, there is much that can and needs to be done without a reversion to failed, 
relatively closed economy, interpretations of industrial intervention.  
                                                 
26 As evidence of the difficulty of setting priorities in an era of rapid technical change nearly 200 
products were listed as ‘strategic’ in Taiwan in the late 1980s as part of its targeting high technology 
activities, although less than half of these had asked for special assistance (Smith 2000: appendix D).    15
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Table 1: Industrial policy taxonomy 
Market-based measures  Coverage  Rationale 
R&D tax credits   Functional  Technology spillovers and risk-
taking externalities 
State industrial research and 
education  
Functional  Creation of national 
technological capability 
Labour training subsidy  Functional  Labour training externality 
State venture capital funds  Selective  Risk-taking externality 
State export promotion agency   Functional  Lack of information and 
provision of a public good 
Infrastructure provision for 
Special Economic Zones 
Functional  Encouragement of clustering 
and agglomeration effects 
Profits tax holidays   Functional  Encouragement of 
manufacturing investment 
Undervaluation of exchange rate   Functional  Encouragement of 
internationally traded activities, 
including manufacturing 
Promotional measures     
Temporary financial assistance   Selective  Funding to allow restructuring of 
uncompetitive activities 
Temporary import tariff 
protection  
Selective Protection  of  uncompetitive 
activities requiring restructuring 
State procurement policy   Selective  Priority in access to public sector 
contracts 
Export subsidy  Selective  Differential rates of subsidy 
based on productivity potential 
Import tariffs   Selective  Differential rates of protection 
based on productivity potential 
Directed credit   Selective  Priority allocation of credit based 
on productivity potential 
Profits tax holidays (selective)  Selective  Favourable tax treatment for 
foreign investors 
Incentive packages of tax, loans 
and infrastructure  
Selective  Favourable treatment for foreign 
investors 
Source: Weiss (2011: Box 7.1). 
 